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 OIL AND REFORM A LA MEXICANA 
JOHN BAKER* 
ABSTRACT 
 Mexico’s recent Energy Reform sent a shock to upend its seventy-five-year-old petroleum 
monopoly, hoping to cure the ailing industry with injections of foreign investment. Mexico 
sought to undo a history of state control overnight, but present challenges show that history 
cannot be undone so easily. This Note addresses the practical significance of the Reform 
within the context of Mexico’s tumultuous oil history. This context aids in defining the cause 
and contours of post-Reform challenges to measure future expectations accordingly. The 
Reform was a necessary step that required herculean efforts to effectuate; however, future 
growth will require sustained efforts. Long-term economic stability depends on Mexico’s 
ability to minimize investor uncertainty and provide Pemex with the latitude to make stra-
tegic business decisions without the hindrance of political influence.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Mexico stands as a prime example of the ironic correlation be-
tween abundant resources with massive potential and economic in-
stability. Over the past hundred years, Mexico has had a tumultuous 
relationship with oil, its chief source of revenue.1 Early successes 
brought foreign investment but comparatively inequitable arrange-
ments. Elevated conflict led to the 1938 expropriation of the petrole-
um industry from foreign investors.2 The aftermath of the expropria-
tion and subsequent poor decisions created enduring losses from 
which Mexico is still suffering.3 In a bold move, President Nieto an-
nounced a radical liberalization of the industry.4 The remaining ques-
tion, of course, is whether the reforms will be enough to turn the 
page, especially in light of current economic conditions. Mexico pro-
jects significant future growth, but will the Reform5 be enough to 
overcome Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)’s6 institutional and historical 
challenges in the oil industry? The Reform aims to inject foreign in-
vestment to heal Mexico’s ailing economy, but it might be too little 
too late. Pemex is struggling with record high debt and Mexico’s first 
post-Reform bidding round failed to attract much interest.7 Mean-
while, the global oil market remains depressed and recovery is uncer-
tain. The Reform presents the opportunity to reverse declining pro-
duction and diversify risk to achieve sustainable economic growth; 
however, successful implementation requires confronting historical 
challenges and adapting to survive amidst new ones. 
 This Note will analyze the significance of the Reform and future 
expectations of implementation. The first two Parts will provide con-
text with a look into Mexico’s history and the recent challenges that 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Clare Ribando Seelke et al., Cong. Research Serv., R43313, Mexico’s Oil and Gas 
Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for the United States 1, 18 (2015). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Section III.A. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. For simplicity’s sake, this Note will use “Reform” to refer collectively to President 
Nieto’s energy reforms enacted in the Constitutional Reform and Secondary Legislation. 
 6. Petróleos Mexicanos is Mexico’s state-owned oil and gas company. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
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precipitated reform efforts. Mexico’s last oil revolution left open 
wounds, which multiplied the growing pains of implementation. Part 
II will analyze the social dynamics and inequities from which Pemex 
was born. Early oil agreements brought massive successes but kept 
wealth in the hands of foreigners. These inequalities aggravated the 
underlying social tensions that fueled the Mexican Revolution. The 
Mexican Revolution established a new regime, which attempted to 
extract greater benefits from the foreign oil companies for Mexico. 
These attempts were met with extreme resistance and tensions rose 
until the government enacted the first radical oil reform. The gov-
ernment expropriated the entire industry and established a complete 
monopoly under the newly  
formed Pemex.8 
 Pemex was given the enormous task of running the entire oil sec-
tor, top to bottom, despite its lack of expertise. Part III will examine 
how Pemex handled this massive task and the recent events, which 
created the urgent need for reform. In the aftermath of the 1938 ex-
propriation, Mexico was forced into isolation so Pemex could not ben-
efit from new technologies or the expertise of foreign oil companies.9 
Mexico relied heavily on Pemex to sustain the economy. Pemex was 
expected to run the entire industry with a crippling tax burden and 
in an extremely restrictive regulatory environment.10 Pemex ran like 
a governmental ministry, and its politically appointed leadership 
failed to make strategic, long-term investments. Despite brief periods 
of success, these systemic problems have severely inhibited Pemex’s 
growth. More recently, declining production and a weak market cre-
ated an immediate need for change.11 
 The status quo was no longer an option. In response to these chal-
lenges, President Nieto enacted the Reform in hopes of lifting the 
Mexican economy. Part IV will examine, in greater detail, the content 
and structure of the recent Reform. The Reform puts a swift end to 
the state-run monopoly. The key takeaway from the Reform is its 
flexibility. The Reform allows for an adaptive approach to generate 
revenue. Attracting investors requires a balanced consideration of 
risk and reward. Part V will inquire into Mexico’s implementation 
efforts in pursuit of attracting investors and improving Pemex. Mexi-
co’s earliest efforts to attract investors were marked by disappoint-
ment; however, recent bidding successes show that Mexico’s newly 
minted regulatory agencies can adapt to the market effectively.12 
Pemex, however, is struggling to adapt. Current economic conditions 
                                                                                                                  
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Section III.A. 
 10. See infra Section III.A.  
 11. See infra Section III.B.  
 12. See infra Part V. 
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and lingering government control exacerbate Pemex’s challenges. 
The stakes could not be much higher, and the short-term prognosis is 
bleak, but undue focus on short-term gains is what created the ur-
gency for change in the first place. This Note urges for cautious opti-
mism. The Reform takes on many problems that have historically 
hindered growth, but growing pains should be expected. The Reform 
gives Pemex and the Ministry of Energy significant flexibility to 
make strategic, long-term decisions, and escape the inevitable boom 
and bust associated with the old regime’s politically motivated short-
term approach. Despite short-term challenges, improvements and a 
refocused Pemex CEO show indications of future economic growth. 
Laws can be rewritten overnight, but rewriting history takes longer. 
II.   PAST TROUBLES 
 A la Mexicana simply means “the Mexican way.” Mexico’s history 
in the oil industry is as unique as it is controversial. Foreign invest-
ment sparked Mexico’s meteoric rise to the global forefront of the in-
dustry, but Mexico hardly partook in the benefits.13 Inequities aggra-
vated underlying social tensions until revolution consumed the coun-
try. Post-revolution reform stripped foreign companies of their rights 
and placed full industry control in the hands of the state-run oil com-
pany, Pemex. Seventy-five years later, Pemex maintained its monop-
oly and stood as a symbol of Mexican nationalism and triumph.14 
Radical reform has returned to center stage of Mexican history. Pres-
ident Nieto recently broke the monopoly and implemented a host of 
liberalizing reforms to once again permit foreign oil industry invest-
ment within Mexican borders.15 The “[e]nergy reform is the most im-
portant economic change in Mexico in the last 50 years.”16 The recent 
reforms, President Nieto’s “signature issue,”17 do more than nudge 
Mexico’s petroleum industry towards greater liberalization; they rep-
resent a radical departure from the state-run monopoly, finally un-
locking the door for competition and foreign investment. This Section 
                                                                                                                  
 13. JONATHAN C. BROWN, OIL AND REVOLUTION IN MEXICO 225 (1993).  
 14. Energy Reform is the Most Important Structural Change in Mexico in the Past Fifty 
Years: EPN, MÉXICO: PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA (quoting President Nieto), 
http://en.presidencia.gob.mx/articles-press/energy-reform-is-the-most-important-structural-
change-in-mexico-in-the-past-fifty-years-epn [https://perma.cc/LU43-2PCF] (last updated 
Mar. 19, 2014). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Carlos Manuel Rodriguez & Adriana Lopez Caraveo, Mexico Oil Opening First 
Time Since 1938 Shows Revival: Energy, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2012, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-25/mexico-oil-opening-first-time-since-
1938-shows-revival-energy [https://perma.cc/JZ8J-MUH7]. 
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will provide the necessary context to understand President Nieto’s 
statement and the effect of his administration’s reforms. 
 Despite abundant resources, Mexico has had a tumultuous history 
in the oil market since the discovery of oil at the turn of the twentieth 
century.18 At the time, the Mining Laws of 1884 and 1892, enacted 
during the Porfirio Díaz regime, formed the legal basis of oil compa-
nies’ ownership rights. The laws held that hydrocarbons were the ex-
clusive property of the owner of the soil,19 and that ownership shall 
be irrevocable and perpetual.20 These expansive rights were essen-
tially equivalent to fee simple ownership and were markedly stronger 
than those granted through the concessionary systems used in the 
Middle East.21 The attractive terms prompted significant foreign in-
vestment from Britain and the United States propelling Mexico to 
center stage in the world market. However, Mexico’s status as the 
world’s second-largest oil producer22  
was short-lived.  
 Díaz brought massive foreign investment to fuel Mexico’s rapid 
development, but his Darwinian approach to rule provoked political 
and social unrest, watering the seeds of revolution.23 Díaz’s predatory 
use of public domain laws enabled him to expropriate land from Mex-
ican landowners and concentrate wealth among his supporters and 
foreign investors.24 As economic conditions worsened, the foreign oil 
companies were increasingly perceived as leeches, exploiting Mexican 
resources and hoarding wealth while the populous suffered.25 Díaz 
sought to maintain power by buying off would-be rivals26 and ruth-
                                                                                                                  
 18. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.  
 19. Código de Minería de 22 de Noviembre de 1884, tit. 1, art. 10, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF] 26-11-1884. 
 20. Ley Minera de 4 de Junio de 1892, tit. 1, arts. 3-5, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF] 4-6-1892.  
 21. Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petro-
leum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT’L L.J. 13, 23-24, 27 (1989). 
 22. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.  
 23. The Díaz regime “engineered the conditions that would lead to the  
Revolution. . . . [And] opportunistically appropriated from Darwin’s recently published 
theories, in ways that allowed the strong to prosper and the weak to serve.” William D. 
Signet, Grading a Revolution: 100 Years of Mexican Land Reform, 16 L. & BUS REV. AM. 
481, 493-94 (2010). 
 24. Public domain laws were used as a tool of oppression to rob Mexican landowners 
and place eighty-seven percent of private landownership in the hands of one-fifth of one 
percent of the population. Id. at 495.  
 25. Tomás Clayton, José Díaz-Guerro & José Garcia-Cervantes, Foreign Investment in 
Mexico: Mexico Welcomes Foreign Investors, 12 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 13, 13-14 (1992). 
 26. Charles Wilson Hackett, The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910-
1926, in WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION PAMPHLET SERIES 339, 340 (1926). 
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lessly silencing his opposition,27  but soon revolution became inevita-
ble.  
 The Mexican Revolution ended the Díaz regime and sought to es-
tablish public order by centralizing power.28 The government was 
broke from revolution, and the wealthy oil companies were the most 
logical targets. Mexico tried to move towards a concessionary system 
with new petroleum laws to extract greater wealth from the oil in-
dustry. Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 and The Petroleum Law 
of 1925 vested natural resources ownership with the nation and cre-
ated a concessionary system, which required oil companies to register 
their rights in recognition of these principles.29 Oil companies resist-
ed these changes and refused to pay rising taxes because of their 
prejudicial retroactive effect.30 Resentment grew on both sides for 
decades as the Mexican economy lay prostrate and famine broke out 
as foreigners thrived.31 Tensions came to a head in 1938. President 
Lázaro Cárdenas made the radical decision to oust the foreign oil 
companies and expropriate the entire petroleum sector.32 Under-
standably angered at the outright seizure of long-enjoyed ownership 
rights, the oil companies boycotted Mexican oil triggering Mexico’s 
rapid fall from grace.33 After President Cárdenas’ decree allocated the 
expropriated assets to Pemex as the only oil company in the coun-
try,34 Pemex became and remains an iconic national symbol of tri-
umph against foreign intervention.35 Despite these successes, isola-
tion from international markets and new technologies drove a steady 
economic decline for the next twenty years.36 
 While still suffering these repercussions long after expropriation, 
Mexico discovered Cantarell field, which was one of the largest dis-
coveries in the world and remains Mexico’s largest discovery in histo-
ry.37 Prices for oil more than doubled just as Mexico regained its sta-
                                                                                                                  
 27. Díaz even went so far as to jail one of his rivals during the election. Signet, supra 
note 23, at 497. 
 28. BROWN, supra note 13, at 213.  
 29. Id. at 226.  
 30. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 21, at 29. 
 31. BROWN, supra note 13, at 213. 
 32. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 21, at 29-30. 
 33. Esperanza Durán, Pemex: The Trajectory of a National Oil Policy, in LATIN AMERICAN 
OIL COMPANIES AND THE POLITICS OF ENERGY 145, 171-72 (John D. Wirth ed., 1985). 
 34. Historia de Petróleos Mexicanos, PEMEX, http://www.pemex.com/en/about-pemex/ 
history/Paginas/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3TP-ANJ5]. 
 35. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
 36. Christopher C. Joyner, Petróleos Mexicanos in a Developing Society: The Political 
Economy of Mexico’s National Oil Industry, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 63, 67 (1982). 
 37. Tim R Samples, A New Era for Energy in Mexico? The 2013-14 Energy Reform, 50 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 603, 612 (2016). 
2017]  OIL AND REFORM 1231 
 
 
tus as a major oil producer.38 Pemex reached the pinnacle of its oil 
and gas history ushering in a miracle era for Mexico with an expo-
nentially rising GDP averaging 6.5 percent growth annually.39 Mas-
sive profits led to massive growth as Mexico significantly expanded 
public spending and industrialized rapidly.40 The gap between the 
standard of living in Mexico and the United States began to close. 
Pemex’s success became a source of national pride because it was at-
tained without the help or hindrance of foreign investment. The suc-
cess story of Mexico garnered praise and was internationally hailed 
as the preeminent model of economic development.41  
 Just as the sun appeared to shine so brightly for Mexico, crashing 
oil prices focused the light on poor investment decisions and unsus-
tainable financial imbalances. As prices plummeted, Mexico’s brief 
flirtation with petroleum paradise came to a close; “[t]he miracle era 
passed . . . and growth never recovered.”42 Simply put, Mexico failed 
to plan for the long term. When oil prices were high, Mexico was able 
to leverage its assets to borrow funding for development, but ram-
pant overspending led to budget deficits, amplifying the financial im-
balances of debt-fueled growth. Massive debt, the focus on short-term 
production, and a glaring lack of adequate infrastructure invest-
ments left Pemex ill-prepared to succeed when the inherently volatile 
oil prices inevitably fell.43 Many of these issues still inhibit Pemex’s 
growth even after the monumental reform. 
III.   PRESENT CHALLENGES ADD URGENCY 
 Throughout its history, Pemex has been plagued by inefficiencies 
and underperformance due to poor investment decisions, insufficient 
infrastructure, exclusion from the world market, criminal activity, 
and crippling tax burdens.44 Mexico’s economy is closely tied to 
Pemex, which provides roughly one-third of total government reve-
nues.45 Since 1998, Pemex has operated at a loss.46 Declining produc-
tion and rising domestic consumption add urgency to the plea for 
change. This Section will give an overview of the challenges Pemex 
currently faces, some of which it has endured since its creation; oth-
                                                                                                                  
 38. EDUARDO BOLIO ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., A TALE OF TWO MEXICOS: 
GROWTH AND PROSPERITY IN A TWO-SPEED ECONOMY 23 (2014). 
 39. Id. at 4.  
 40. Id. 
 41. See Samples, supra note 37, at 622.  
 42. BOLIO ET AL., supra note 38, at 4.  
 43. Samples, supra note 37, at 614-18. 
 44. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2-3. 
 45. BOLIO ET AL., supra note 38, at 23; Samples, supra note 37, at 614. 
 46. SEELKE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. 
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ers are more recent due to current global and regional economic con-
ditions. 
A.   Old Problems That Refuse to Go Away 
 Pemex is often referred to as simultaneously existing as Mexico’s 
“cash cow” and “sacred cow.”47 Cash cow refers to Pemex’s crippling 
tax burden while sacred cow refers to its status as a symbol of na-
tionalism and the corresponding restrictive legislative regime in 
which it exists.48 These attributes conflict and have led to heavy loss-
es despite an abundance of potential. Being a cash cow limits 
Pemex’s ability to invest in its own future and this limitation is mul-
tiplied by legislative constraints on Pemex’s ability to invest. 
 1.   Death by Taxes  
 The first part of the cash cow/sacred cow irony is the crippling tax 
burden that bleeds Pemex dry. By comparison, Exxon Mobil is the 
only energy company with larger pre-tax profits; however, after tax-
es, Pemex’s ranking drastically falls to 86th place.49 Pemex has his-
torically been subject to high taxes, but more recently the numbers 
have been astronomically high. Pemex’s taxes far surpass the indus-
try average of 35 percent among integrated oil producers.50 In 2012, 
“[t]he oil producer paid 99.5 cents for every dollar of the $71 billion in 
pretax revenue.”51 Even with recent tax cuts, taxes are still overly 
burdensome. In 2013, Pemex lost $13 billion despite $126 billion in 
revenues.52 Mexico is heavily dependent on these taxes, which 
amount to more than “total government spending on social programs, 
education, and public health and safety.”53 Notably, without these tax 
revenues, Mexico’s 2013 deficit would have been closer to 9 percent of 
                                                                                                                  
 47. Tim R. Samples & José Luis Vittor, The Past, Present, and Future of Energy in 
Mexico: Prospects for Reform Under the Peña Nieto Administration, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
697, 698 (2013); Samples, supra note 37, at 614. 
 48. Samples, supra note 37, at 614. 
 49. Id. at 615. 
 50. Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, Death of 99% Pemex Tax Soothes Oil Monopoly Fate: Mexico 
Credit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2013, 1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-
27/death-of-99-pemex-tax-soothes-oil-monopoly-fate-mexico-credit [https://perma.cc/EV6B-ML3F].  
 51. Id.  
 52. Samples, supra note 37, at 615. 
 53. Michael D. Plante & Jesus Cañas, ‘Reforma Energética’: Mexico Takes First Steps to 
Overhaul Oil Industry, DALL. FED., https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/swe/ 
2014/swe1402g.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBE-43KF]. 
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GDP instead of 1.7 percent.54 All major parties have agreed that this 
overt overdependence has inhibited growth and must change.55 
 2.   Too Big to Win  
 The other side of Pemex’s dual existence is its role as the sacred 
cow. Taxes prohibitively limit Pemex’s working capital. As Mexico’s 
sacred cow, legislation significantly constrains the use of the remain-
ing revenue crumbs. Private companies often treat underperforming 
units like tree branches, cutting off dead branches for the overall 
health of the tree. Mexican legislation took away this option for 
Pemex: “As a virtual monopoly, Pemex was responsible for covering 
all of Mexico’s hydrocarbon needs—upstream, midstream, and down-
stream—regardless of expertise or profitability.”56 This burden was 
made heavier through the Petroleum Law of 1958, which expressly 
prohibited Pemex from entering into standard risk-sharing horizon-
tal agreements that based compensation on production levels.57 Thus, 
Pemex was forced to fully shoulder the burden of risky ventures. 
Practically, this has led to massive losses and forestalling opportuni-
ties to develop infrastructure and learn from corporations with great-
er experience in a particular area. For example, Pemex does not have 
adequate refineries or transportation infrastructure so Mexico is 
forced to import half of its gasoline.58 Likewise, even with all its re-
serves, limited pipeline capacity requires Mexico to import one-third 
of its natural gas and turn to expensive liquefied natural gas im-
ports.59 Strategic investments have been left by the wayside in favor 
of short-term production as “Pemex has essentially been run as a 
ministry of the government.”60 With greater outside foreign invest-
ment, Pemex could potentially solve these inadequacies and reduce 
needlessly expensive imports. 
B.   New Problems 
 The challenges Pemex faced were remarkable. Pemex managed to 
keep Mexico afloat for decades without international support despite 
massive tax burdens and a restrictive legal environment.61 Unfortu-
nately for Pemex, the problems did not end there. Domestic and glob-
                                                                                                                  
 54. Id.  
 55. Rodriguez, supra note 50. 
 56. Samples, supra note 37, at 617. 
 57. Ley Reglamentaria del artículo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petróleo, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-29-1958. 
 58. Samples, supra note 37, at 618. 
 59. Id. at 618. 
 60. Id. at 639. 
 61. See Samples, supra note 37, at 612-17. 
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al market concerns piled more on Pemex’s ever-growing list of chal-
lenges. Domestically, rising energy consumption, declining produc-
tion with elevated production costs, and an overall struggling econo-
my created a significant hurdle for Pemex’s future. Internationally, 
the oversaturation of the oil market and global oil crash created an 
immediate threat to Pemex’s survival. Without reform, Pemex would 
have inevitably failed and the repercussions for Mexico would have 
been disastrous. 
 1.   Domestic Concerns 
 Domestic concerns forced Mexico to face facts: the status quo was 
unacceptable. Without drastic reforms, Mexico’s future was bleak. 
Production has been in rapid decline over the past decade. In 2005, 
production was 3.3 MMbbl/d (million barrels/day), but, by 2013, pro-
duction fell to 2.5 MMbbl/d.62 The Cantarell field, which brought 
Pemex to the peak of its history, is aging rapidly. In 2013, the Can-
tarell field accounted for only 17 percent of Mexico’s production as 
compared with 63 percent in 2004.63 In addition to the Cantarell 
field, approximately 80 percent of Mexico’s oil fields are in advanced 
stages of production decline.64 Increasing domestic consumption exac-
erbates the problem of declining production. Some studies have sug-
gested that Mexico may become a net importer of oil within the next 
decade.65 Mexico is already a net importer of petroleum products, im-
porting just about everything except oil.66 Mexico’s economy is heavi-
ly dependent on oil revenues. The tax revenues from Pemex account 
for more than one-third of governmental revenues and 11 percent of 
Mexico’s economy.67 Replacing this critical revenue stream with a def-
icit would have disastrous effects on the Mexican economy. Pursuing 
deepwater resources could turn the tide on declining production, but 
Pemex simply does not have the resources or expertise to develop 
                                                                                                                  
 62. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT NO. DOE/EIA-0484, 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014: WORLD PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUID FUELS 16 
(2014), http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2014).pdf [https://perma.cc/AXT9-BNBB]. 
 63. Samples, supra note 37, at 612. 
 64. SECRETARÍA DE ENERGÍA DE MÉXICO, ESTRATEGIA NACIONAL DE ENERGÍA 2013-
2027 41 (2013). 
 65. KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III & RONALD SOLIGO, RICE U. JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR 
PUB. POL’Y, SCENARIOS FOR OIL SUPPLY, DEMAND AND NET EXPORTS FOR MEXICO 25 (2011). 
 66. Laurence Iliff, Oil-Rich Mexico Becomes Net Importer of U.S. Petroleum 
Goods, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304908304579562400748296622. 
 67. Juan Montes & Laurence Iliff, Mexico Outlines New Oil Sector Policies for 
Private Firms, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2014, 9:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303948104579533790440136238. 
2017]  OIL AND REFORM 1235 
 
 
deepwater and other unconventional resources.68 Furthermore, rising 
production costs severely limit the viability of pursuing costly deep-
water exploration to counterbalance declining production.69 In light of 
these factors, reform became critical for Mexico’s future. 
 2.   Global Market 
 Foreign investment could bring the necessary resources and ex-
pertise to turn the tides on declining production, but attracting for-
eign investors is complicated by the current economic climate. Over-
production amidst waning demand created a global oil crash. Oil 
prices are known to go through boom and bust cycles,70 but this price 
drop was different. The recent bust was more than a market response 
to fluctuating demand; it was the outgrowth of a fundamental shift in 
the supply-demand balance.71 Oil is a volatile industry, and this vola-
tility has had profound effects on Mexico’s economy.72 Although sys-
temic problems sparked Mexico’s growing need for reform, the global 
oil crisis dictated the timing.  
 New technologies disrupted the global oil market by unlocking 
vast United States tight oil resources that were previously unattain-
able.73 Domestic oil companies flooded the market to develop the un-
tapped resources and reduce reliance on imported oil.74 As the United 
States sprinted towards energy independence, major world oil suppli-
ers scrambled to compete for new buyers in an increasingly saturated 
market.75 The United States, however, was not the only country re-
ducing oil imports. Rising domestic production brought new suppliers 
and altered market shares, but socioeconomic factors reduced the size 
of the entire market. Emerging economies like China “have entered a 
new, less oil-intensive stage of development.”76 Likewise, the global 
economy, in general, has become less fuel dependent due to the glob-
alization of the natural gas market, the development of renewable 
energies, and climate change concerns that have altered energy poli-
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cies.77 Japan, for example, has decreased its oil consumption by 22% 
since 2000.78 The International Energy Agency reported that these 
changed market conditions will impact how prices rebound, which 
will stabilize “at levels higher than recent lows but substantially be-
low the highs of the last three years.”79 This fundamental shift in 
global oil trade economics has threatened OPEC’s market dominance, 
forced oil companies to sell off assets, and added a high level of risk 
for investors.80 Global suppliers have been forced to adapt. Likewise, 
Mexico needed to change so Pemex could survive. Even with reform, 
success was far from guaranteed, but reform was a necessary first 
step.  
IV.   THE REFORM 
 This Part will discuss the major changes and key provisions in the 
recent Reform of Mexico’s oil sector with an analysis of how they may 
address Pemex’s current challenges. The newly increased autonomy 
will bring both opportunities for success and challenges associated 
with adjusting to a new legal framework with increased competition. 
This Part will give a brief explanation of the legal framework and of 
the Reform; analyze Pemex’s new role and how it fits into the new 
system; and provide an overview of other notable provisions within 
the Reform. Their future success will heavily depend on Mexico’s 
ability to attract foreign investment and Pemex’s ability to adapt to 
the new environment with the effective implementation of long-term 
management strategies. 
A.   Legal Framework 
 Mexico’s recent, dramatic energy Reform took place in two major 
phases. The first phase amended the constitution to remove the con-
stitutional barriers to investment.81 Unhindered by constitutional 
restrictions, the legislature passed a substantial amount of revised 
legislation in August 2014, collectively known as the Secondary Leg-
islation.82 The governing instruments relevant to the oil industry are 
the new Hydrocarbons Law, the Hydrocarbons Revenue Law, the 
Pemex Act, the Coordinated Regulatory Bodies Act, the Law on the 
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National Agency on Safety and Environmental Protection in Hydro-
carbons Matters, and the Foreign Investment Act.83 These instru-
ments dramatically change the entire energy industry.  
 Mexico’s Secondary Legislation completely reorganizes the petro-
leum industry with the addition of new regulatory bodies and liberal 
policies that permit foreign investment.84 The Secondary Legislation 
created the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) and the Na-
tional Agency on Safety and Environmental Protection in Hydrocar-
bon Matters (ASEA). It also allocates varying levels of regulatory and 
oversight responsibility between the newly created entities and the 
Ministry of Energy (SENER), the Ministry of Finance, and the Ener-
gy Regulatory Commission (CRE).85 Broadly speaking, SENER and 
CNH will approve the grant, transfer, and migration of entitlements, 
as well as supervise compliance with their terms.86 They will also ne-
gotiate the technical aspects of E&E contracts.87 SENER and CRE 
will also establish the permit regime and enforce regulatory compli-
ance with them.88 The Ministry of Finance will work to negotiate the 
fiscal terms in these agreements.89 ASEA will not take a direct part 
in the formation of agreements; however, ASEA will establish the 
regulations that govern them.90 Article 129 of the Hydrocarbons Law 
gives ASEA authorization to issue regulation for industrial and oper-
ational safety, environmental protection, and sustainable develop-
ment of the energy sector.91 According to an official statement, their 
mission is “[t]o guarantee people’s safety and the environment integ-
rity with legal, procedural, and cost-effectiveness certainty within the 
hydrocarbons sector.”92 Together, these entities work to create and 
oversee production agreements. 
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B.   What Types of Agreements Can They Authorize? 
 The rights to conduct particular upstream activities are allocated 
to state-productive enterprises (SPE) like Pemex and private parties 
through Entitlements and Exploration and Extraction (E&E) con-
tracts.93 This is a marked change from the prior regime, which only 
permitted fee-based service contracts.94 This Part will discuss the 
various agreements authorized by the reform as well as important 
provisions common to every agreement. SENER and CRE allocate 
rights to conduct upstream activities to both state-productive enter-
prises and private contractors. Entitlements give exclusive rights to 
state-productive enterprises in a particular area or for a particular 
project.95 E&E contracts give private contractors varying rights to 
conduct upstream activities.96 The particular rights depend on which 
of the four contractual models the regulatory agency chooses. These 
broad options provide an enabling approach that is well suited to en-
courage investment in a wide variety of situations. “As a result, Mex-
ico will go from being one of the most limited major jurisdictions for 
energy investment to being among the more flexible.”97 The regulato-
ry agencies’ options, and production agreements in general differ in 
the ways they allocate risk and reward between the state and inves-
tor. 
 1.   Entitlements 
 The first method of allocating rights in the upstream industry is 
through Entitlements.98 An Entitlement is an exclusive right to con-
duct E&E activities.99 The Ministry of Energy will grant Entitle-
ments on an exceptional basis to Pemex or any other state-productive 
entity.100 In order for SENER to grant an Entitlement, the National 
Hydrocarbons Commission must submit a favorable technical opin-
ion.101 Such Entitlements may be renounced or transferred to another 
SPE, but only with prior authorization from SENER.102 SPE may not 
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transfer Entitlements to private parties, but these parties are au-
thorized to execute service contracts as long as consideration is cash, 
not rights to a percentage of in-kind production.103 SENER will have 
significant authority to oversee and revoke Entitlements.104 
 Traditionally, Pemex had the right to conduct these activities via 
Entitlements; however, the new regime establishes more stringent 
requirements and provides greater oversight. The Reform granted 
greater autonomy to Pemex, but now Pemex has to deal with compe-
tition. In order to level the playing field, Pemex was granted 
Entitlements through “Round Zero.”105 This internal bidding round 
was essentially a right of first refusal for areas Pemex was currently 
producing or actively exploring. Pemex submitted requests to retain 
E&E rights to these areas. SENER determined which rights Pemex 
would keep and which rights would be offered for public bidding 
based on proof of Pemex’s financial and technical capacity to develop 
the resource.106 SENER granted Pemex Entitlements to “100 percent 
of PEMEX’s producing areas; 83 percent of Mexico’s proven and 
probable reserves (2P Reserves); and . . . 21% of Mexico’s prospective 
resources.”107 In effect, Pemex will still play a dominant role in Mexi-
co’s E&E activity, but the door is now open for other players to step 
into undeveloped areas. The goal is to stem declining production by 
directing foreign investment towards undeveloped areas that Pemex 
does not have the resources or technical capacity to develop effective-
ly.108 Until now, Pemex had to shoulder the burden of the entire oil 
industry. The Reform presents room to shift some of that burden to 
foreign investors. 
 2.   E&E Contracts 
 Entitlements are hydrocarbon rights directly granted to state-
productive enterprises.109 Foreign companies will not be given Enti-
tlements. Foreign investors enter the process through E&E con-
tracts.110 E&E contracts are production agreements that confer rights 
to either state-productive enterprises or private contractors. These 
contracts will be negotiated during a competitive bidding process that 
CNH will conduct.111 The Reform outlines four contractual model 
agreements to give the regulatory agencies wide discretion to choose 
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the appropriate model on a case-by-case basis.112 This Section will 
analyze the structure of the agreements and some of their key provi-
sions.  
 (a)   Competitive Bidding 
 CNH will conduct competitive bidding rounds for E&E contracts 
according to the technical and fiscal guidelines set by SENER and 
the Ministry of Finance, respectively.113 SENER will select the con-
tractual area, either on its own volition or upon recommendation 
from Pemex or another state productive enterprise. SENER will work 
with CNH to establish the technical prequalification criteria and 
technical contract terms.114 The Ministry of Finance will establish the 
fiscal terms for the contract and the bidding process.115 The bidding 
process will begin when CNH publishes the call for bids in the Feder-
al Official Gazette.116 The call for bids will detail the bidding re-
quirements, award mechanisms, prequalification criteria, and pro-
vide a minimum of 90-days within which to submit bids.117 The bid-
ding results will then be published in the Federal Official Gazette 
and CNH will execute the contracts.118  
 (b)   Structure of the Agreements 
 The bidding process will be fairly consistent, but the content and 
structure of the agreement will differ on a case-by-case basis.119 The 
Reform allows for significant flexibility to account for varying levels 
of risk. Generally speaking, the two main types of production agree-
ments are concessionary agreements and contractual agreements.120 
Concessionary agreements grant the investor title to the hydrocar-
bons in consideration for a small state royalty.121 The investor has 
considerable managerial control over production and carries the ma-
jority of production risk and reward. Under contractual agreements, 
the investor receives a share of production, but the state maintains 
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title; production risk is more evenly distributed and the state receives 
a greater profit share.122 The government has a larger vested stake in 
the project and, therefore, is more likely to directly participate and 
control the project. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution reaffirms 
that all hydrocarbons are owned by the state and specifically prohib-
its concessionary agreements. However, it significantly liberalizes 
the industry by authorizing contractual agreements with production-
based compensation.123 The Reform creates four E&E contractual 
models: (1) licenses; (2) production sharing contracts; (3) profit shar-
ing contracts; and (4) service contracts.124 These options allow for 
flexibility to encourage significant foreign investment but do not re-
vert to the pre-1938 concessionary regime. This flexibility will be key 
in attracting investors. 
 (1)   Licenses 
 While concessionary agreements are explicitly prohibited, licenses 
are essentially a more balanced, modern version of concessions.125 
The use of the word license instead of concession is reflective of the 
“[p]olitical sensitivities around concessions [due to] lingering memo-
ries of Mexico’s early history with foreign oil companies.”126 In fact, 
this is not uncommon. The word “concession” still carries a negative 
connotation reminiscent of early inequitable agreements. Bargaining 
power shifted after the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and states started to receive better 
deals with increasing royalties and more control over operational de-
cisions.127 As agreements developed greater balance, the word “con-
cession” has often been replaced with the label “license” even though 
the underlying concessionary structure has remained intact.128 When 
Mexico’s agencies opt for the licensing structure, the contractor will 
own the hydrocarbons in-kind at the wellhead in consideration for 
cash payments in the form of a signing bonus, exploratory phase fees 
(analogous to United States rental fees), royalties, and a percentage 
of the contract value of the hydrocarbons.129 Unlike pre-1938 conces-
sionary agreements with ten percent royalties, Mexican licenses “will 
likely land near the higher side of the industry standard range of fif-
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ty to seventy-five percent.”130 Following the modern trend, Mexico 
will retain more operational control, impose heightened minimum 
work and investment obligations, and limit duration.131 Even with 
better terms, licenses still give far more control to the contractor 
than alternative agreements. This high-level of risk management al-
location will likely be chosen for development in particularly risky 
projects, like deepwater exploration. 
 (2)   Production and Profit Sharing Agreements 
 As briefly discussed earlier, production agreements vary in their 
allocation of risk. Production sharing agreements and profit sharing 
agreements are similar to licenses in many ways. All three have the 
same terms regarding exploratory phase fees and royalties and will 
include similar minimum work and investment obligations.132 The 
primary distinctions are the level of state control, national oil com-
pany participation, and the division of operating profits.133 These 
agreements allocate risk and operational control more evenly than 
licenses. Due to the greater vested interest, direct state participation 
is more common in these agreements.134 As with licenses, exploratory 
phase fees will be paid in cash, but royalties and operating profits are 
apportioned differently. Royalties are paid in-kind, meaning Mexico 
will receive a portion of the actual hydrocarbon production instead of 
a cash payment.135 Operating profits are calculated after deducting 
royalties and cost recovery.136 Cost recovery is a method of paying the 
contractor back for the substantial investment and operating costs 
involved in extracting hydrocarbons.137 After these costs are subtract-
ed, Mexico will receive a percentage of the operating profits in-kind.  
 The only real difference between production sharing agreements 
and profit sharing agreements is the form of payment to the contrac-
tor. In production sharing contracts, the contractor retains in-kind 
production equivalent in value to recoverable costs and its share of 
operating profits.138 In profit sharing contracts, Mexico keeps all the 
production and gives the contractor cash payments for cost recovery 
and its share of profits made on the sale of hydrocarbons.139 Produc-
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tion sharing agreements are significantly more common in the global 
oil industry,140 but the additional profit sharing model adds flexibility 
that could potentially increase investment. 
 (3)   Service Contracts 
 The last option available to Mexico’s regulatory agencies is a ser-
vice contract model. Prior to the Reform, the Petroleum Law of 1958 
only permitted “pure” service contracts.141 Under pure service con-
tracts, companies perform a particular service for a fixed fee that is 
independent of production results.142 The Reform now allows risk ser-
vice contracts. Risk service contracts tie compensation with the re-
sults of production. The company performs the service and is only 
compensated if production occurs. The exact terms vary, but compen-
sation may be in-kind, a percentage of profits, or a preferential right 
to purchase the oil.143 Depending on the terms, risk service contracts 
become more or less comparable to production sharing agreements; 
however, service contracts tend to be more limited in scope and dura-
tion. 
 (c)   Key Provisions Applicable to All E&E Contracts 
 The Reform provides a flexible approach so the regulatory agen-
cies will have wide discretion to choose the type of agreement that is 
advantageous for Mexico while still attractive enough to draw in for-
eign investment. Many important contract terms regarding opera-
tional control and compensation will vary by the chosen contractual 
model and particular case; however, key provisions of the Hydrocar-
bon Law ensure particular advantageous terms will be a part of every 
E&E contract. These key provisions, “common to almost all interna-
tional petroleum arrangements around the world. . . . [A]re national 
content, tax and royalty structures, minimum work obligations, and 
dispute resolution.”144 This Section will analyze these key provisions 
in the Reform. The Reform sets required contract terms in these are-
as that are in line with international standards.145 
 (1)   National Content 
 National content, in petroleum agreements, refers to particular 
contractual obligations that are designed to “accomplish strategic 
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goals for domestic industry.”146 The exact methods vary, but typical 
obligations require a specified minimum percentage of national em-
ployees, investment in domestic infrastructure, preferential treat-
ment for national products and services, and local training. The Re-
form combines all of those obligations into an overall “national con-
tent” formula: (National Content Goods + National Content Labor + 
National Content Services + National Content Training + National 
Content Technology Transfer + National Content Infrastructure) / 
(Goods + Labor + Services + Training + Technology Transfer + Infra-
structure) * 100 = National Content Percentage.147 The Hydrocarbon 
Law requires a minimum national content percentage of 35 per-
cent.148 The Law requires 35 percent as an average across the indus-
try and provides that individual contractors must progressively 
achieve a percentage determined by SENER.149 Additionally, the Hy-
drocarbon Law explicitly excludes E&E activity in deep and ultra-
deep waters from this requirement.150 This flexible, progressive ap-
proach strikes a good balance to provide local benefits without over-
burdening the contractor. Flexibility is key to avoid chilling invest-
ment, as evidenced by the poor results directly attributable to Bra-
zil’s onerous national content requirements.151  
 Although perhaps not technically classified as “national content,” 
the Hydrocarbon Law also helps build national expertise and 
knowledge through required disclosures. The Law expressly states 
the geological, geophysical, petrophysical, and petrochemical infor-
mation, and in general the information, which is obtained or has 
been obtained from surface surveying and exploration, as well as 
E&E belongs to the nation.152 Contractors are required to deliver this 
information to CNH. CNH will use this information to create and 
manage the National Center of Hydrocarbons Information which will 
collect, store, analyze, and publish this information subject to certain 
time-limited confidentiality restrictions.153 This will help build Mexi-
co’s practical knowledge and expertise as a result of each project. 
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 (2)   Minimum Work and Investment Program 
 While not listed as a mandatory requirement, the Hydrocarbon 
Law envisions the likely inclusion of minimum work and investment 
programs in E&E contracts.154 Similar obligations are standard in 
petroleum agreements.155 Typically, contractors must commit to in-
vest a specified amount of money and meet work benchmarks at par-
ticular intervals (e.g., $50 million required investment with at least 
two exploratory wells completed within four years). The exact terms 
will vary project-by-project, but the Round One minimum work pro-
grams averaged approximately $1 billion for each project.156 These 
requirements serve to align the state and contractor’s interests to 
work quickly towards production. This is reflective of risk-bearing 
shifts as E&E projects develop.157 Before production, the state bears 
the risk that the contractor will not efficiently manage resources or 
drill and drop. As E&E projects get closer to the production stage, the 
risk begins to shift onto the contractor. Once production has begun, 
the risk is squarely on the contractor that the state will not honor the 
contract. The contractor is protected, at least on some level, from ille-
gitimate expropriation because such action would inflict significant 
reputational damage on the state and the loss of future investment 
opportunities. Minimum work programs help protect the state in the 
pre-production phase. If the contractor drills and drops, the contrac-
tor will lose a significant amount of money. This heightened conse-
quence serves to mitigate the state’s risk. 
 (3)   Royalty and Tax Calculations 
 Perhaps the most important contractual provisions for the state 
and contractor are the compensation provisions, which decide how 
profits will be allocated. As with other provisions, Mexico has opted 
for a flexible approach. Royalties vary based on market prices. If oil 
prices are under $48/barrel, the royalty will be 7.5 percent.158 When 
oil prices rise above $48/barrel, the royalty will be calculated accord-
ing to this formula: [(0.125 * Contractual Price for Petroleum) + 1.5] 
percent.159 An additional, vaguely worded provision provides Mexico 
with an “adjustment mechanism” to capture “extraordinary re-
turns.”160 It remains to be seen when and how Mexico may invoke 
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this provision. The rest of the fiscal terms are fairly straightforward. 
Rental fees follow a common pattern: they are imposed on a “per-
kilometer” basis and increase as the project develops to encourage 
effective resource management.161 Signing bonuses ensure that im-
mediate state revenue will be decided on a case-by-case basis.162 E&E 
activities are subject to the standard 30 percent corporate tax, which 
compares favorably to the many countries that charge a higher tax 
rate for E&E activities.163 Outside of the vague adjustment mechanism, 
the fiscal terms are standard for the industry.164  
 (4)   Dispute Resolution 
 Given the significant time and monetary investments for E&E 
projects, dispute resolution forms a key part of E&E contracts. The 
Hydrocarbon Law distinguishes between “administrative rescission,” 
which will be handled in Mexican courts, and other disputes that 
may go to arbitration.165 Administrative rescission effectively termi-
nates the E&E contract upon the occurrence of “serious” circum-
stances, such as failure to comply with the minimum work commit-
ment, serious accidents, or other serious breaches.166 The concern, 
here, is the extremely broad nature of these serious breaches. It is 
unclear how “serious” one of the listed occurrences needs to be for 
Mexico to invoke administrative rescission. Other less serious 
breaches may be covered by an alternative arbitration agreement. In 
the model Round One production sharing agreements, arbitration 
will be conducted in The Hague according to the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law’s rules.167 Notwithstanding 
UNCITRAL or the chosen arbitral rules, all arbitration agreements 
are adjusted to the following conditions in every case:  (1) the appli-
cable laws shall be Mexican federal laws; (2) they shall be conducted 
in Spanish; and (3) the award shall be strictly at law and shall be 
binding and final for both parties.168 The location and UNCITRAL 
rules provide some stability and standardization to the arbitration 
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process; however, the administrative rescission exception may prove to 
be extremely disconcerting for potential investors. 
 The Reform represents a radical departure from the state monopo-
ly system. Some of the contract terms are problematic and their prac-
tical application will be discussed in Part V; however, the key takea-
way from this analysis is flexibility. Mexico used to have zero flexibil-
ity.169 The Reform is a radical step towards liberalization. The Consti-
tutional Reform created the possibility for foreign investment in the 
oil sector. The Secondary Legislation gave the Reform some teeth. 
The Secondary Legislation created new regulatory agencies and ex-
panded the role of others. It created a transparent process, which al-
lows for maximum flexibility so CNH can choose the contractual 
model best-suited for a particular project. The key provisions, for the 
most part, are in line with international standards. They will require 
adjustment to maximize investor attractiveness; however, the Reform 
is a monumental first step in Mexico’s path towards a liberalized en-
ergy sector. 
V.   MEASURED EFFECTS AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS 
 The previous Section discussed the text of the Reform. This Sec-
tion will discuss the realities of post-Reform implementation. Pemex 
is struggling to adapt to the new environment and rid itself of linger-
ing challenges. In order for Pemex to succeed, the promise of greater 
autonomy and lower tax burden needs to become reality. Confronting 
new challenges while remaining shackled with these old problems is 
too great a task. These are certainly significant short-term concerns, 
but appear attributable to both bad timing (market-wise) and the 
natural growing pains of implementing such radical change. Like-
wise, the Mexican government has faced growing pains in attracting 
investors. The first oil tender was a major disappointment; however, 
the government learned from their mistakes and made adjustments 
in the most recent oil tenders. The improvements had immediately 
beneficial results in attracting significant investment. Despite recent 
successes, there is still room for further improvement to minimize 
investor risk and increase international competitiveness. When eval-
uating the future, this Note urges for cautious optimism. Many prob-
lems exist, but a realistic assessment could not have expected over-
night success. On a whole, the Reform has been a success, just not an 
overnight success. Reforming Pemex and attracting investors re-
quires overcoming hurdles on many fronts to achieve balance. Mexi-
co’s recent successes show the fruits of such efforts. These steady im-
provements are indicative of future growth and telling with regards 
to the nature of current challenges. They are the growing pains of 
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Mexico’s oil sector rebirth. They are hurdles to be overcome in the 
short-term; meanwhile, in the long-term, the Reform promises to re-
vitalize an ailing energy sector and provide economic growth. 
A.   Pemex 
 Part III of this Note discussed some of the major problems, which 
historically have inhibited Pemex’s growth. The systemic problems 
are the result of a crippling tax burden and a restrictive regulatory 
environment. Declining production and a weak global market further 
strained Pemex’s ability to make strategic investments. This Section 
will discuss how the Reform has fared against these problems. The 
Reform cannot make global oil prices rebound any faster but aimed to 
correct Pemex’s systemic inefficiencies and turn the tides on declin-
ing production. In theory, these changes should help reduce Pemex’s 
substantial burdens and generate higher profits. These changes cer-
tainly bring opportunity, but reengineering Pemex is a work in pro-
gress. The short-term outlook is negative; however, the Reform 
should bring long-term gains for Pemex by reducing its historical 
burdens. 
 1.   Present Effects 
 Pemex, post-reform, is struggling. Moody’s Investor Service has 
given Pemex a negative outlook rating in the short to medium term 
because “oil prices remain depressed, production continues to drop, 
taxes remain high, and the company’s capex needs are financed with 
debt.”170 
 Pemex has always been hampered by an enormous tax burden and 
a restrictive legal environment. The Reform promised lower taxes 
and greater autonomy so Pemex could make strategic investment de-
cisions and adapt to the new competitive environment. Overall, the 
Reform has not yet had much of a positive impact on Pemex’s growth. 
 Pemex’s tax burden has declined but still remains high. Over the 
next four or five years, taxes from Pemex are expected to contribute 
over 20 percent of the government’s annual budget.171 High taxes 
mean Pemex must use debt to fund capital expenditures. Over the 
last three years, Pemex has increased its debt but has not achieved 
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sustained growth.172 Pemex has liquidity problems with record high 
losses and massive debt.173 Production is still in decline and a weak 
global market hinder profitability.174  
 Likewise, Pemex was promised greater autonomy, but the gov-
ernment still exerts too much influence on Pemex’s operations. Con-
ceptually, Pemex has been transformed into an entirely different en-
tity. “The productive state enterprise model is a theoretical departure 
from the ‘ministry’ approach of past governance: Pemex will have 
greater latitude to place a greater emphasis on generating profits.”175 
Historically, Pemex’s board of directors was composed entirely of po-
litical appointees so corporate decisions were often politically moti-
vated and unduly focused on short-term gains.176 The Reform elimi-
nates political appointments altogether, creates stricter requirements 
to ensure independent directors, and modernizes the board’s struc-
ture.177 The Reform gives Pemex significantly more administrative 
and budgetary autonomy178 to choose its projects and focus on strate-
gic long-term gains. This is certainly a welcome change but does not 
go far enough. Pemex’s investment decisions are constrained by an-
nual Congressional approval with regards to its maximum borrowing 
threshold and net financial balance.179 This control must be lessened 
for Pemex to be able to focus on long-term gains instead of short-term 
political goals.  
 2.   Challenges Present Opportunity 
 Lingering systemic problems weigh heavy on Pemex as it adapts 
to a new regulatory regime in a competitive environment. The timing 
of these radical changes could not have been much worse.180 Imple-
mentation began just as global oil prices started free falling. Weak 
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global demand, depreciation of the Mexican peso, and declining pro-
duction magnify Pemex’s struggles to restructure.181 Despite signifi-
cant current challenges, the Reform presents opportunities for in-
creasing Pemex’s profitability and long-term growth. 
 Pemex needs to reckon with the reality of low oil prices and make 
strategic decisions accordingly. Although the tough economic climate 
presents a significant challenge, the pressure may turn out to be 
beneficial in the long-term. Low oil prices are forcing Pemex to make 
serious budget cuts and drastically improve efficiencies. Learning to 
thrive in the worst of times will prepare Pemex for future success. In 
the 1970s, the opposite occurred. Pemex had major success in a high-
price environment, but mismanagement left the company in dire 
straits when the market crashed.182 Now, Pemex finds itself in the 
opposite situation by being forced to increase efficiency to survive the 
low-price environment. The Reform accords Pemex tremendous flexi-
bility to adapt and thrive. Pemex’s new CEO, Jose Antonio Gonzalez 
Anaya, noted how Pemex seeks to take advantage of the Reform’s 
opportunities.183 Until now, Pemex had to completely shoulder the 
risk of the entire oil sector. Post-Reform, Pemex has the opportunity 
to refocus. Anaya explained that Pemex will be selling off assets, par-
ticularly non-strategic downstream assets.184 By selling off non-
strategic assets, Pemex can increase revenues and efficiency for long-
term, sustainable profitability. Beyond selling assets, Pemex now has 
the opportunity to make strategic partnerships. Pemex no longer is 
forced to shoulder the burden of the entire industry. For so long, 
Pemex was isolated. Now free from this isolation, Pemex needs to use 
strategic partnerships to build its own expertise and increase effi-
ciency.  
 Pemex has a tough road ahead. There is a lot of history to over-
come and Pemex is struggling to overcome it. Overnight change, 
simply, was an unreasonable expectation. Despite challenges, the 
Reform offers Pemex with many ways to adapt and make strategic 
decisions. Pemex is mired in debt and the global market is weak. 
With time, a refocused Pemex will be able to increase revenues to 
fund strategic investments without raising its debt ceiling. Mexico 
has given some support to help Pemex manage its debt.185 While this 
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will certainly help in the short-term, Pemex’s long-term success will 
depend on how it uses its newfound flexibility. The new CEO appears 
prepared to confront these challenges head-on and use the Reform to 
break ground.  
 If Pemex can take advantage of the opportunity to reduce risk and 
refocus on strategic profit-focused decisions, Pemex will be a vastly 
more profitable and efficient business. 
B.   Foreign Investment 
 A basic tenet of economics is investors need to be compensated for 
their risk.186 Competitive offers require a sufficiently attractive bal-
ance of risk and reward.187 The oil market, specifically, is an inher-
ently risky business venture. When investors look at an opportunity, 
they compare the venture-specific risk with the fiscal terms. At its 
core, venture-specific risk is composed of geographical risks (will this 
block produce oil?), legal risks (what are my contractual rights, and 
will I be able to enforce them?), and country-specific risks (will politi-
cal strife, criminality, or other country-specific problems have an effect 
on this venture?). Countries increase competitiveness with attractive 
fiscal terms and risk-minimization. Becoming and staying competi-
tive is a complex balancing act. This Section will analyze Mexico’s 
recent post-Reform attempts at reaching this balance and discuss 
how Mexico can adapt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. 
 1.   Bidding Results 
 The first bidding auction after the Reform was marked by disap-
pointment. CNH placed fourteen blocks for bid, but only awarded two 
blocks.188 CNH commissioner, Juan Carlos Zepeda, acknowledged the 
results fell well below expectations of awarding four to five blocks.189 
Prohibitively high minimum bids, tough contract terms, and the low-
price oil environment contributed to the poor results. CNH only re-
ceived six bids but threw out four for not meeting the minimum re-
quirements.190 Some analysts point to CNH’s lack of discretion as a 
major hindrance in completing deals with the bids. For example, 
CNH was not allowed to negotiate or accept an offer below the undis-
closed minimum government take of 40 percent operating profit.191 If 
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CNH had sufficient discretion to negotiate, they may have achieved a 
deal at a slightly lower profit percentage. This certainly seems pref-
erable to arbitrary rejection.  
 Although the first bidding auction did not generate the results 
hoped for, Luis Videgaray Caso showed optimism about the success of 
the round to establish confidence in Mexico’s ability to conduct a 
transparent bidding process. He explained that this was just a first 
step and Mexico will have to analyze the market to adapt effective-
ly.192 The government made good on this promise and made numer-
ous improvements for subsequent rounds. The improvements led to a 
very successful third auction, which surpassed expectations, particu-
larly in light of continuing low oil prices. The third auction resulted 
in awards for all twenty-five onshore exploration fields offered for 
bidding.193 Altogether, this will bring in an expected $1.1 billion of 
investment over the next twenty-five years.194 This is a remarkable 
change in such a short period. Despite improvements, certain policy 
choices and country risks, if left unaddressed, may derail future bid-
ding rounds and will not maximize benefits for Mexico.195  
 2.   Fiscal Terms 
 Overall, Mexico has created fiscally attractive terms for investors, 
as proven by recent successes; however, Mexico could improve fiscal 
competitiveness in its bidding process.196 Mexico has demonstrated 
an “excessive focus on rent collection . . . rather than a focus on broad 
based development of a wide range of Mexican oil and gas re-
sources.”197 This was quite evident with the strict minimum govern-
ment take in the first auction. The focus of the bidding formula needs 
to be expanded to give more consideration to the amount of work to 
be performed. Otherwise, less promising blocks will go undeveloped. 
Blocks that are less geographically desirable cannot be expected to 
fetch the same price as others. When Mexico foreclosed the possibility 
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of making a deal based on an undisclosed royalty minimum, Mexico 
left value on the table. Now those blocks will not be developed. This 
is an economic waste for both Mexico and investors. Additionally, un-
due focus on royalty percentage leads to over-bidding, which will cre-
ate future problems between the government and investor. 198  
 3.   Legal Risk 
 Legal risk comes from contractual and regulatory uncertainty. In-
vestors want to know what their rights and liabilities are and how 
those will be enforced. More unknowns mean more risk. Mexico has 
made significant improvements to the contractual rights, but uncer-
tainty still exists. On the other side of the coin, unclear regulations, 
inexperienced regulatory agencies, and corruption concerns pose 
enforcement-related risk. 
 (a)   Contractual Uncertainty 
  Mexico has made significant improvements to the competitive-
ness of its contract terms. Mexico appears to be on the right path, but 
additional changes could improve competitiveness by limiting exces-
sive governmental discretionary decision-making power. Such discre-
tion, particularly in the contract’s termination clauses, pose risk to 
investors and potentially opens the door for corrupt behavior.199 The 
termination clauses grant CNH too much power to terminate the con-
tract for specified, relatively non-serious breaches. For example, 
CNH may terminate the contract after any delay of 180 days in im-
plementing any work program.200 The termination clauses also permit 
termination for failure to file proper reports and other administrative 
violations.201 Termination is a nuclear remedy, which should be re-
served for more serious contract breaches and violations. Additional-
ly, the only recourse is through Mexican courts. As it stands, these 
clauses give the government too much discretionary power. The po-
tential for abuse poses significant risks, thereby reducing interna-
tional competitiveness.  
 (b)   Regulatory Uncertainty 
 Regulatory uncertainty poses additional legal risk to potential in-
vestors. The Reform created new regulatory agencies and expanded 
the roles of others. “Judicial and regulatory authorities lack experi-
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ence in oversight of a competitive energy sector, a factor further com-
plicated by the implementation of a still evolving regulatory re-
gime.”202 Given the new and evolving nature of the Reform and its 
regulatory authorities, many regulations lack clarity and investors 
cannot be sure if their rights will be protected or how compliance will 
be enforced. Massive allegations of fraud in Pemex and consistently 
low country ratings in Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ceptions Index pose additional enforcement-related risk.203 Experi-
ence and regulatory clarity will come with time as the agencies de-
velop and adapt to the new competitive environment. These are 
prominent concerns, but they are short-term concerns. Corruption is 
the more salient long-term issue. Despite anti-corruption measures, 
corruption is still disconcertingly prevalent.204  
 4.   Country Risk 
 Perhaps, the biggest country-specific risk is criminality. Pipeline 
tapping is a cause of major concern for investors. Pemex provided 
statistics showing criminal groups tapped pipelines, stealing over $1 
billion in hydrocarbons between 2012 and 2013.205 Carlos Elizondo, a 
board member at Pemex, explained cartels pose a major source of 
worry to potential investors: “I’m afraid oil companies coming to Mex-
ico will have to worry about insecurity as much as about drilling.”206 
The enormous black market for oil has triggered an exponential rise 
in pipeline tapping.207 Pipeline tapping is not the only issue. Kidnap-
ping and extortion have been on the rise as well. “A 2013 survey by 
the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico found that on aver-
age, foreign investors allocated around 4 percent of operating costs to 
security . . . .”208 The offshore oil sector may avoid many of these prob-
lems, but the onshore violence will still be a source of concern, par-
ticularly for transportation.209 President Nieto created a new security 
framework, which has had some notable successes in preventing or-
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ganized crime.210 Efforts to lower violence are ongoing and have shown 
some promise, but security will remain a prominent investor concern 
for the foreseeable future.211 
 Since the Reform, Mexico has shown the competence to implement 
a transparent bidding process. Early disappointments led to marked 
improvements. These changes pave the way for a promising future, 
but significant challenges remain for Mexico to be internationally 
competitive and best serve its own long-term interests. To increase 
competitiveness, Mexico needs to be open to better fiscal terms for 
less geographically desirable blocks and reduce legal risk by limiting 
opportunities for abuse.212 Mexico has made great strides to minimize 
contractual uncertainty but could create more competitive terms by 
eliminating excessive discretionary agency powers. Inexperienced 
agencies and evolving regulations pose short-term hurdles, which 
will likely lessen as Mexico adapts to the newly liberalized market. 
Corruption, however, poses a greater long-term threat. Previous anti-
corruption measures have been relatively fruitless. Eradicating cor-
ruption is likely an unrealistic goal (certainly not a short-term goal), 
but limiting regulatory discretion and establishing clear enforcement 
guidelines will go a long way in easing investors’ concerns. Like cor-
ruption, criminality is a long-term problem. Mexico will need to ad-
dress investors’ security concerns to increase competitiveness. Look-
ing towards the future, Mexico appears to be confronting these chal-
lenges head-on in efforts to achieve the right balance of risk and re-
ward to attract investors. Recent successes show these efforts are 
paying dividends. Balance does not come overnight, and Mexico will 
continue to struggle with growing pains, but the post-Reform future 
looks promising. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Mexico has abundant potential, but years of market isolation left 
Mexico woefully short from realizing it. The Reform is a radically 
powerful step towards reaching that potential, but change is not 
easy. Early bidding rounds have not lived up to expectations; howev-
er, credit must be given for the herculean reform efforts that brought 
Pemex out of its monopolistic entrenchment into the modern oil mar-
ket. The Reform is “the most important economic change in Mexico in 
                                                                                                                  
 210. KATHRYN HAAHR, WILSON CTR., ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS OF THE OIL 
INDUSTRY: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NORTHEASTERN MEXICO AND GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES 14-15 (2015) (explaining how Nieto’s new security strategy has been used to 
arrest narco-traffickers and disrupt cartel activities).   
 211. PGI INTELLIGENCE, supra note 202. 
 212. Cocaine, Guns and Oil Investors Weigh Mexico Risks, CNBC (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/06/cocaine-guns-and-oilinvestors-weigh-mexico-risks.html 
[https://perma.cc/7KDN-QMF7]. 
1256  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1225 
 
 
the last 50 years.”213 While a necessary change, the Reform, alone, is 
insufficient. Pemex must disentangle itself from the government’s 
lingering hold, modernize its structure, and adapt to the new market 
and regulatory environment. Mexico needs to develop its newly cre-
ated entities to generate income in diverse areas of the industry. Ad-
ditionally, Mexico needs to encourage investment by minimizing in-
vestor uncertainty with clear regulations, attractive contractual 
terms, and effective action against criminal interference. This is no 
easy task. Mexico’s initial predictions were, perhaps, overreaching. 
Current predictions are cautiously optimistic. Even with the stated 
need for reservations, growth is expected as early implementation 
efforts adapt to the learning curve. The timeframe for this growth is 
difficult to predict due to the radical nature of the Reform. Pemex’s 
creation through expropriation was equally radical, but decades 
passed before Pemex brought Mexico back to the forefront of major 
global oil producers. The landmark Reform was instantaneous, but 
its effective development took time and it was not all positive. Mexi-
co’s radical oil Reform triggered rising tensions that escalated the 
urgency for more radical change. Perhaps, this second constitutional 
one-eighty will follow the same pattern. Hopefully, Mexico will learn 
from the past and tackle present challenges thereby achieving stra-
tegic long-term growth. If so, this radical Reform could end the cycle 
instead of becoming, yet another, piece in the tumultuous history of 
oil and reform a la Mexicana. 
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